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We use robust control to study how a central bank in an economy with imperfect 
interest rate pass-through conducts monetary policy if it fears that its model could be 
misspecified. The effects of the central bank’s concern for robustness can be 
summarised as follows. First, depending on the shock, robust optimal monetary policy 
under commitment responds either more cautiously or more aggressively. Second, such 
robustness comes at a cost: the central bank dampens volatility in the inflation rate pre-
emptively, but accepts higher volatility in the output gap and the loan rate. Third, if the 
central bank faces uncertainty only in the IS equation or the loan rate equation, the 
robust policy shifts its concern for stabilisation away from inflation. 
Keywords: optimal monetary policy, commitment, model uncertainty 
JEL Classification:  E44, E58, E32 Non-technical summary 
In general, the central bank acknowledges that every model is incomplete and, 
therefore, a misspecified description of reality. Consequently, it needs to design a policy 
that is robust against model misspecification. We incorporate model uncertainty by 
following the robust control approach along the lines of Hansen and Sargent (2008) and 
assume that the true model is not known but lies in the neighbourhood around a 
reference model.  
We employ as a reference model a version of the New Keynesian model that is able to 
replicate stylised facts of the monetary transmission mechanism in the euro area. The 
model incorporates financial intermediaries and features imperfect interest rate pass-
through from the policy rate to the loan rate. The effects of the central bank’s concern 
for robustness can be summarised as follows. First, we observe that monetary policy 
responds either more cautiously or more aggressively depending on the type of shock. 
The ambiguity stems from the fact that the central bank sets the interest rate such that 
the volatility of inflation is not increased by the policy response. In those cases where 
the response itself raises the volatility of inflation, the central bank responds more 
cautiously; otherwise, it responds more aggressively.
Second, robustness comes at a cost: the central bank dampens volatility in the inflation 
rate pre-emptively, but simultaneously accepts higher volatility in the output gap and 
the loan rate. The central bank’s concern for misspecification shows that the robust 
policy is oriented towards stabilising the inflation rate, although the central bank also 
cares about minimising the welfare costs of the imperfect interest rate pass-through. 
Third, if the central bank faces uncertainty only in the IS equation or the loan rate 
equation, the robust policy shifts its concern for stabilisation. We find that, in both 
cases, the central bank reduces the volatility in the output gap and the loan rate but 
accepts higher volatility in inflation.  Nicht technische Zusammenfassung 
Im Allgemeinen sind sich Zentralbanken bewusst, dass jedes Modell nur eine 
unvollständige und daher fehlerhafte Beschreibung der Realität darstellen kann. 
Deswegen müssen sie eine Politik wählen, die robust gegenüber Fehlspezifikationen ist. 
Wir berücksichtigen Modellunsicherheit und folgen dabei dem von Hansen und Sargent 
(2008) entwickelten Ansatz zur robusten Kontrolle. Wir unterstellen, dass das wahre 
Modell nicht bekannt ist, aber sich in der Umgebung eines Referenzmodells befindet. 
Als Referenzmodell unterstellen wir eine Version des neukeynesianischen Modells, das 
in der Lage ist, wesentliche stilisierte Fakten des monetären Transmissionsmechanismus 
für den Euro-Raum abzubilden. Das Modell enthält einen Finanzintermediär, der 
Änderungen im geldpolitischen Leitzins nur verzögert über Kreditzinsen weitergibt. Die 
Ergebnisse hinsichtlich der Berücksichtigung von Modellunsicherheit können wie folgt 
zusammengefasst werden: Erstens, je nach Schock reagiert die Geldpolitik aggressiver 
oder zurückhaltender. Die uneinheitliche Reaktion liegt in der Tatsache begründet, dass 
die Zentralbank ihren Zins so wählt, dass sich die Volatilität der Inflation nicht durch 
die Zinsreaktion selbst erhöht. In den Fällen, in denen die Zinsreaktion selbst zu einer 
stärkeren Schwankung der Inflation führt, reagiert die Zentralbank zurückhaltender. 
Zweitens, die robuste Politik ist mit Kosten verbunden. Die Zentralbank verringert 
präventiv die Volatilität der Inflation, akzeptiert aber dabei, dass Schwankungen der 
Produktionslücke und der Kreditzinsen zunehmen. Die Bedenken der Zentralbank 
hinsichtlich einer etwaigen Fehlspezifikation des Modells zeigen sich darin, dass die 
robuste Politik auf eine stärkere Stabilisierung der Inflationsrate abzielt, obwohl sie 
grundsätzlich auch anstrebt, diejenigen Wohlfahrtsverluste zu minimieren, die mit einer 
unvollständigen Zinsweitergabe des Bankensektors verbunden sind. 
Drittens, wenn die Zentralbank allein die Unsicherheit in der IS Kurve oder in der 
Bestimmungsgleichung für die Kreditzinsen berücksichtigt, verschiebt sich der Fokus 
der Stabilisierung. In diesen Fällen zielt die Zentralbank auf eine stärkere Verringerung 
der Volatilität der Outputlücke und der Kreditzinsen ab und toleriert dabei eine höhere 
Volatilität der Inflation. Contents
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with imperfect interest rate pass-through
1
1 Introduction 
Even similar models produce different predictions of how monetary policy affects the 
dynamics of policy-relevant variables. Cateau (2006), for example, illustrates that 
different New Keynesian models involve different policy transmission mechanisms. It is 
not obvious how monetary policy should cope with the different policy 
recommendations. The origin of the central bank’s difficulty in setting the policy rate 
lies in the fact that the policymaker does not know the true model or is not able to fully 
capture it. In general, the central bank acknowledges that every model is a 
simplification, necessarily incomplete and, therefore, a misspecified description of 
reality. Consequently, it seeks to design a policy that is robust against model 
misspecification. 
In this paper, we incorporate model uncertainty by following the robust control 
approach along the lines of Hansen and Sargent (2008). We do so by assuming that the 
true model is not known but lies in the neighbourhood around a chosen reference model. 
The central bank is not able to formulate a probability distribution over plausible 
models in that neighbourhood but recognises that data might not be generated by the 
reference model. Robust control then provides a way for the central bank to find a 
policy that performs well in the worst possible outcome of a pre-specified set of models. 
1   Rafael Gerke and Felix Hammermann, Deutsche Bundesbank, Economics Department, Wilhelm-
Epstein-Strasse 14, 60431 Frankfurt, Germany, email: firstname.lastname@bundesbank.de. The views 
expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank or the Eurosystem. We appreciate the helpful comments and suggestions made by Heinz 
Herrmann, Teruyoshi Kobayashi, Peter Tillmann, Andreas Worms and participants at the Society of 
Computational Economics Conference in London, 2010. We are indebted to Paolo Giordani, Paul 
Söderlind, and Ulf Söderström for making their programme codes available to us. All remaining errors 
and shortcomings are, of course, our own. 
1We employ as a reference model a version of the New Keynesian model that is 
able to replicate stylised facts of the monetary transmission mechanism in the euro area, 
namely that (i) changes in the monetary policy rate have only temporary effects on euro-
area output but long lasting effects on prices; (ii) monetary policy affects the economy 
mainly through the interest rate channel; and (iii) changes in the policy rates are not 
completely passed through to retail lending rates.
2 Specifically, we use an extension of 
the New Keynesian model, as suggested by Kobayashi (2008), which incorporates 
financial intermediaries and allows for an endogenous spread between the interest rate 
received by savers and the rate paid by borrowers. Banks supply loans to intermediate 
goods-producing firms but can adjust the loan rates only infrequently.
3 The associated 
staggered loan rate setting leads to imperfect interest rate pass-through from the policy 
rate to the loan rate. The central bank optimises a welfare-based objective function and 
is able to commit. Since the model involves loan rate dispersion, the optimal monetary 
policy not only stabilises inflation and the output gap but also tries to avoid loan rate 
fluctuations.
We explore how model uncertainty affects monetary policy decisions if the true 
model is not known. The effects of the central bank’s concern for robustness can be 
summarised as follows. First, we observe that monetary policy responds either more 
cautiously or more aggressively depending on the type of shock. The ambiguity stems 
from the fact that the central bank sets the interest rate such that the volatility of 
inflation is not increased by the policy response. In those cases, where the response 
itself raises the volatility of inflation, the central bank responds more cautiously; 
otherwise, it responds more aggressively. Our result stands in contrast to the standard 
New Keynesian model where a preference for robustness always makes the central bank 
respond more aggressively (see, for instance, Giordani and Söderlind, 2004 or Leitemo 
and Söderström, 2008a). 
Second, robustness comes at a cost: the central bank dampens volatility in the 
inflation rate pre-emptively, which means that it has to accept at the same time higher 
2   See de Bondt, Mojon and Valla (2005) for an overview with respect to the imperfect interest rate pass-
through. To the above short list may be added: (iv) credit constraints are probably not crucial at the 
aggregate level, and (v) it is difficult to detect systematic differences across countries. See, for 
instance, Cecioni and Neri (2010). 
3   For a similar model, see Teranishi (2008). 
2volatility in the output gap and the loan rate. The difference between the worst-case 
equilibrium and the approximating equilibrium suggests that the central bank’s concern 
for misspecification, and therefore the robust policy, is oriented towards stabilising the 
inflation rate, although it also cares about minimising the welfare costs of the imperfect 
interest rate pass-through.
4
Third, if the central bank faces uncertainty only in the Phillips curve, the changes 
of the variances coincide qualitatively with the benchmark model (misspecification in 
all equations). If, however, uncertainty is present only in the IS equation or the loan rate 
equation, the robust policy shifts its concern for stabilisation. We find that in both cases 
the central bank reduces the volatility in the output gap and the loan rate but accepts 
higher volatility in inflation. The result hinges crucially on the assumption that the 
policymaker is not concerned about model uncertainty regarding the Phillips curve. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the 
New Keynesian model with a banking sector and staggered loan rate setting. We 
describe the linearised model and its calibration. In Section 3, we give a short review of 
the robust control approach and present the robust monetary policy under commitment 
when uncertainty prevails in the Phillips curve, the IS equation, and the loan rate 
equation. We also investigate the cases when uncertainty surrounds only one equation at 
a time. Finally, Section 4 concludes.  
2 Model 
We describe briefly the New Keynesian model with a financial intermediary suggested 
by Kobayashi (2008) that features a cost channel and imperfect interest rate pass-
through as documented for the euro area. The model not only replicates the stylised fact 
that changes in the policy rate are not completely passed through to retail lending rates 
but also allows us to show that the incorporation of financial intermediation might have 
ambiguous effects with respect to model uncertainty. 
4  In the worst-case equilibrium, the model is indeed misspecified, whereas in the approximating 
equilibrium, the model is not misspecified, but the policymaker acts as if the model were misspecified. 
3Overview of the model 
The economy consists of a representative household, intermediate goods firms, final 
goods firms, commercial banks, and a central bank. The representative household 
consumes a bundle of final goods while supplying labour to the intermediate goods 
sector. He/she is required to use cash in purchasing consumption goods and also makes 
a one-period deposit. Each intermediate goods firm produces a differentiated 
intermediate good and sells it to final goods firms. The production of intermediate 
goods requires labour as the sole input. Intermediate goods firms are able to set prices 
flexibly, whereas final goods producers are assumed to follow a Calvo-type price-
setting (Calvo, 1983). The production of final goods requires only a composite of 
intermediate goods. Following Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and Ravenna and 
Walsh (2006) among others, at the beginning of each period the intermediate goods 
firms pay wages in advance to workers. Since the firms receive revenues only at the end 
of each period, they need to borrow funds. There is only one bank active in each region 
and loan markets are assumed to be geographically segmented. Hence, firms borrow 
from the commercial bank of the same region. The commercial banks receive deposits 
and money injection from the central bank and lend funds to intermediate goods firms. 
Banks adjust their loan rates only infrequently, following a Calvo-type adjustment 
mechanism. The model thus replicates the incomplete interest rate pass-through from 
policy rates to loan rates found in many empirical studies (for an overview, see de 
Bondt, Mojon and Valla, 2005). 
Equilibrium dynamics 
Below, for any arbitrary variable  t X , we define  	 
 log tt x XX w , where  X  denotes the 
steady-state value.
5 Define by   the rate of inflation and by   the output gap in the 
economy and by   the average loan rate. Then, the key (log-linearised) equilibrium 
relations can be summarised as follows. Starting with the first-order condition of final 
goods firms, the Phillips curve can be formulated as 
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¯±  (1) 
5   See Appendix A1 for a detailed exposition. 
4where  denotes an aggregate supply disturbance and 	 t e 
 t yr l TX  t  represent real 
marginal cost with   being the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 
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 1 G   the probability that the 
final goods firms can adjust their prices. The Phillips curve differs from a standard New 
Keynesian Phillips curve by the presence of an additional interest-rate term which 
reflects the fact that firms have to borrow funds to pay the wage bill in advance. In 
contrast to earlier versions of New Keynesian models with a cost channel (eg Ravenna 
and Walsh, 2006), the interest rate variable entering the Phillips curve is not the policy 
rate   but the average loan rate   As the model incorporates the profit-maximising 
behaviour of commercial banks, retail loan rates differ from the policy rate in an 
endogenous manner. From equation (1) it is evident that the average loan rate 
determines, to some extent, current inflation, as a rise in the loan rate leads to a higher 
marginal cost in final goods production. Further, as commercial banks face a Calvo-type 
constraint when setting their loan rates, the cost channel is weakened compared with the 
case of perfect interest rate pass-through. 
t r . t rl
The aggregate demand equation in this model is standard and can be derived from 
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where  denotes an aggregate demand disturbance.  t u
Based on the commercial banks’ optimal loan rate setting, the economy’s average 
loan rate can be expressed as a weighted average of the expected loan rate, the current 
















 11 B qq M w  . q C  The expression 	 
 1 q   denotes the probability with which 
the commercial bank can adjust its loan rate. The relative weights on the expected loan 
5rate and the previous loan rate increase as the sluggishness of loan rates deteriorates. 
From rewriting this expression as  
	
 1 tt t B t t rl E rl r rl l CM  % %    Bt M  (3) 
it becomes evident that a change in the loan rate will be caused by an expected change 
in the future loan rate and/or by a discrepancy between the policy rate and the average 
loan rate. The loan rate shock   captures the idea that loan rates tend to fluctuate for 
reasons that are not directly linked with policy behaviour. One possibility could be a 
shift in the loan rate premium triggered by changes in financial market conditions.  
t l
Social welfare 
Kobayashi (2008) derives a welfare criterion based on a second-order approximation to 
the household’s utility function that involves interest-rate smoothing. More precisely, 
the central bank is required to stabilise the rate of change in the average loan rate. 
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where t.i.p. represents terms independent of policy and  	
 , fF Q ZR M T X   ¯ w ¢ ±   
and
1, y Z w
	
 	 
 1 rl z B z ZR M X R T X   w  ¢ ¯± represent the relative weights on inflation, the output 
gap, and the rate of change in the average loan rate, respectively. The parameters  f R
and z T  denote the elasticity of substitution between the variety of final goods and the 
elasticity of substitution for intermediate goods, respectively. As equation (4) 
highlights, fluctuation in the average loan rate will reduce social welfare.  
Calibration 
We conclude the model description with the calibration of the model. We assume that 
the shocks in the Phillips curve (1), in the IS equation (2), and the average loan rate 
equation (3) follow first-order autoregressive processes of the form  
1 ,
s s
tt ss S   t F  (5) 
6where
s S  is the persistence parameter, 
s
t F  a white-noise error term and  .
Unlike Kobayashi (2008), we added the cost-push shock e
	
 ,, se u l 
t and the demand shock ut to 
the model in order to make the analysis more comparable with the literature. All three 
shocks are calibrated to a standard error of 0.005, and the persistence parameters are set 
to 0.9. 
We follow Kobayashi (2008) in setting the fraction of banks that do not reset their 
loan rates q at 0.177, which equals the average of all the estimates reported by 13 
studies surveyed in de Bondt, Mojon and Valla (2005, Table 1). On average, banks set 
their lending rate for approximately one quarter and three weeks. We also follow 
Kobayashi in taking the baseline values of the parameters   and   from Ravenna 
and Walsh (2006) and in setting the elasticity of substitution for intermediate goods 
equal to 
, C , T X
z R
. f R  The value of  f R  is taken from Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), and the 
degree of price stickiness G  is chosen such that the slope of the Phillips curve is equal 
to 0.58, the value reported by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). The calibrated values are 
summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1: Calibration of parameters 
C TXG q




0.99 1.5  1 0.6229  0.177  7.88  7.88 0.9  0.9  0.9 
3  Robust monetary policy  
3.1 Robust  control 
Up to now, we have assumed that the economic agents know the true model of the 
economy with certainty. Uncertainty is introduced merely by additive errors such that 
certainty equivalence holds; that is, the actions of the agents depend solely on their 
expectations of future variables, but not on the uncertainty surrounding those 
expectations. Below, we relax this assumption and describe formally the general 
uncertainty surrounding the model. We follow the approach from the robust control 
7literature along the lines of Hansen and Sargent (2008) and augment the model 
(henceforth called the “reference model”) with a vector of misspecification terms  . 1 t V 
For ease of exposition, we focus only on the general structure of the equilibrium 
dynamics.
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1 C  (6) 
where 0 A , 1 A  and B are matrices of model parameters,   is a vector that scales the 
impact of the vector of error terms  .
C
1 t F  1,t x  is the  -vector of predetermined variables  1 n
< > 1 tt t t eulr l 
a with  1,0 x  given,  2,t x  is the  -vector of forward-looking variables 
 and   is the policy instrument. We obtain the  “distorted” or 
“misspecified” model by including a vector with misspecification terms  :
2 n
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a b  (8)
where  reflects the size of the potential misspecification. The central bank supposes 
that misspecifications are of the worst kind and maximises social welfare (4) by 





tt y t r l y Q ZQ Z Z  %   (9) 
subject to the distorted model (7) and the constraint (8). Hansen and Sargent (2008) and 
Giordani and Söderlind (2004) show that the central bank’s problem can be recast as  



















subject to (7). The parameter R  summarises the central bank’s attitude towards model 
misspecification in setting its policy, which, at the same time, reflects its preference for 
robustness. In particular,   is related to   such that, in the case of no 






The equilibrium in the worst-case model can be described by substituting the 
solution into the distorted model (7). The resulting system describes the worst-case 
model the central bank and the private sector wants to guard against. The approximating 
equilibrium (or model) can be obtained by assuming that there are no misspecification 
errors  but retaining the robust policy and expectation formation under the 
worst-case model. This gives the equilibrium dynamics under robust decision-making 
by the central bank and the private sector. 
1 0, t V  
In order to calibrate the preference for robustness   the concept of a detection 
error probability is adopted. The detection error probability is the probability of making 
the wrong choice between the approximating model and the worst-case model. Smaller 
values of   allow for greater specification errors, which makes it easier for the 
econometrician to distinguish statistically between the two possible equilibriums. 
Hence, a smaller R  reduces the detection error probability. We choose a preference for 
robustness that corresponds to a detection error probability of 20 percent, as suggested 
by Hansen and Sargent (2008, p 219) and Giordani and Söderlind (2004, p 2376). 
, R
R
To illustrate how a preference for robustness alters the dynamics of the model and 
the optimal monetary policy response, we write the solution as a VAR(1) in the 
predetermined variables and a linear relationship between the forward-looking and 
predetermined variables (eg Giordani and Söderlind, 2004, Appendix B): 
1, 1, 1 1



































t  (12) 
where  represents the Lagrange multiplier of the predetermined variables and 
the Lagrange multiplier of the forward-looking variables. The matrices M and N give 
the solution. The optimal implicit instrument rule under commitment depends on the 
predetermined variables 
1,t S 2,t S
1,t x  and the Lagrange multipliers on the forward-looking 














where  is a 	 r N 
 12 1 nn q  sub-matrix of   With respect to Kobayashi’s model the 
state of the economy is given by the predetermined variables and the Lagrange 
multipliers 
. N
1 2 ,2 ,2 , .
yr l
tt t t t t t eulr l
Q SSS 
a  ¯ ¡° ¢±
3.2  The robust policy: More and less aggressive 
We now turn to the effects of robustness on the central bank’s optimal implicit 
instrument rule given by (13) and compare the coefficients of the robust rule with the 
policy rule of the rational expectations (RE) equilibrium (Table 2). As a first notable 
result, we observe that monetary policy responds either more cautiously or more 
aggressively depending on the shock. Specifically, monetary policy responds more 
aggressively to cost-push shocks and loan rate shocks, but less aggressively to demand 
shocks. Thus, much like in recent work such as that by Leitemo and Söderström 
(2008b) and Tillmann (2009), we also find that aggressiveness is not a general feature 
of the robust control approach. Rather, the response of the central bank depends on the 
type of shock. 
10Table 2: Parameters of optimal implicit instrument rule






RE rule  -0.76     1.06    -0.29     0.10     -0.03 -1.02     1.68    
Robust rule  -0.81     1.04   -0.30     0.10     -0.03     -1.02     1.67    
Change in percent  7.15     -1.74     4.21   -0.27     -0.06    0.00     -0.17    
Note: The model is calibrated to a detection error probability of 20 percent by setting T = 0.01129. 
Differences due to rounding errors. 
The last row of Table 2 displays by how much the robust policy changes relative 
to the RE response. In the case of the cost-push shock   the coefficient increases by 
more than 7  percent
t e
7 and in case of a loan rate shock   the relevant coefficient 
increases by more than 4 percent. The latter increase is a remarkable result since a
priori it is not obvious that a loan rate shock should be a concern for the policymaker at 
all: model uncertainty worries the policymaker only if an unexpected shock gives rise to 
a meaningful trade-off between the variables in the loss function. In the present model, 
such a trade-off occurs because the model features a cost channel. The rise in the policy 
rate – the immediate response of monetary policy to a loan rate shock (Figure 1, solid 
line) – not only dampens aggregate demand, it is also passed through to the loan rate, 
thereby increasing firms’ borrowing costs. Via the cost channel, this increases inflation.  
t l
The central bank counteracts a loan rate increase by cutting the policy rate 
immediately and thus does not give rise to an additional increase in inflation via the cost 
channel. The initial interest rate cut is possible since, under commitment, the entire 
policy path affects expectations and, as a result, the central bank has an additional 
instrument at its disposal. However, the staggered loan rates prevent the policy rate cut 
from completely offsetting the initial inflationary effect. To bring back inflation to its 
steady state, the central bank therefore engineers a recession by raising the policy rate 
accordingly. Under commitment, output is lowered for an extended period of time such 
                                                
7   The 7 percent corresponds to an additional increase of 7 basis points for a 100 basis points increase of 
the policy instrument in the RE equilibrium.  
11that inflation expectations fall below steady-state inflation.
8 As the initial policy rate cut 
does not imply higher inflation, the robust policymaker is able to respond more 
aggressively (Figure 1, dashed and dash-dotted line). To understand the last result fully, 
we now turn to the demand shock. 
Figure 1: Impulse responses to loan rate shock 


































The demand shock   induces a more cautious response, since the relevant 
parameter in the implicit instrument rule decreases by almost 2  percent. The result 
differs from the findings for the standard New Keynesian model (eg Leitemo and 
Söderström, 2008a), where the demand shock can be fully stabilised. There is no trade-
off and, therefore, model uncertainty does not alter the optimal monetary policy 
response. In the present model, the cost channel gives rise to a policy trade-off, and this 
explains why the optimal monetary policy differs under model uncertainty. 
t u
                                                
8   In general, the endogenous model dynamics are more clearly visible if the shocks are not 
autocorrelated. 
12To obtain intuition as to why monetary policy responds less aggressively to a 
demand shock, it is useful to describe the model dynamics for the RE equilibrium. 
Figure 2 displays the impulse responses after   goes up (solid line). The central bank 
responds by raising the policy rate. Yet the existence of the cost channel prevents an 
easy stabilisation. The increase in the policy rate is passed through to the loan rate and 
thus causes an immediate increase in marginal cost and inflation, but dampens output 
via aggregate demand. To stabilise the inflation rate, the central bank increases the 
interest rate even more. After the initial hike, inflation eventually converges back to its 
steady state. The inflationary effect of the cost channel (in addition to the inflationary 
effect of the shock itself) is, however, dampened since the commercial banks can adjust 
their loan rate only infrequently with probability 1.
t u
q 
Taking model uncertainty into account, the central bank raises the interest rate, 
but less aggressively, because it is aware that the optimal policy response implies an 
initial increase in marginal cost and, thus, inflation (Figure 2, dashed and dash-dotted 
line). Such a cautious response is quite intuitive: the policymaker is aware that the 
increase in the interest rate in combination with the cost channel causes, on impact, a 
deviation of inflation from its steady state. In turn, the deviation increases volatility of 
inflation and raises the loss in equation (4). To contain the additional volatility, the 
policymaker reacts more cautiously (see also Barlevy, 2009).
9
                                                
9   Barlevy (2009) shows in a few simple examples that neither a less aggressive nor a more aggressive 
policy response is a general feature of robust control. 
13Figure 2: Impulse responses to demand shock 








































To sum up, an increase in the preference for robustness has an ambiguous effect 
on optimal monetary policy. The ambiguity stems from the fact that the policymaker 
sets the interest rate such that – given the high weight for inflation stabilisation in the 
loss function (4) – the volatility of inflation is not increased by the policy response. In 
those cases where the response itself raises the volatility of inflation, the policymaker 
reacts more cautiously.
10 Our result stands in contrast to the standard New Keynesian 
model, where a preference for robustness always makes the central bank respond more 
aggressively (see, for instance, Giordani and Söderlind, 2004 or Leitemo and 
Söderström, 2008a). 
                                                
10  It is interesting to note that, under discretion, the central bank’s response itself raises the volatility of 
inflation for each shock. Consequently, the robust policymaker reacts always more cautiously. In 
Appendix A2, Table A1 gives the changes of the policymaker’s optimal implicit instrument rule under 
discretion. Figures A1 to A3 display the corresponding impulse responses for each of the three shocks. 
143.3  The price of robustness: The approximating equilibrium 
After having described in which ways the robust policymaker deviates from the RE 
equilibrium, we now turn to the costs of such a robust policy. The losses for the RE 
equilibrium, the worst-case equilibrium, and the approximating equilibrium summarise 
succinctly how robustness affects social welfare following equation (4). In the worst-
case equilibrium, the model is indeed misspecified and, therefore, the corresponding 
impulse responses become generally more persistent. Accordingly, the loss in the worst 
case turns out to be the highest (Table 3). In the approximating equilibrium, the model 
is not misspecified, but the policymaker acts as if the model were misspecified. 
Obviously, such a strategy yields a higher loss than the RE rule, but offers a kind of 
insurance against misspecification. The difference between the loss of the 
approximating equilibrium and the loss of the RE equilibrium over the difference 
between the worst-case equilibrium and the RE equilibrium gives an insurance premium 
which amounts to 5.91 percent in the present model. 







Insurance premium  
in percent 
4.62 × 10
-4 8.16 × 10
-4 4.83 × 10
-4 5.91 
Note: Loss as a percentage of steady-state consumption. Differences due to rounding errors. 
The variances in Table 4 allow us to disentangle further the variables through 
which model uncertainty affects social welfare. In the worst-case equilibrium, the three 
target variables “inflation”, “output gap” and “loan rate” as well as the policy 
instrument become more volatile. In the approximating equilibrium, the robust policy 
comes at a cost: the central bank dampens volatility in the inflation rate pre-emptively, 
but simultaneously accepts higher volatility in the output gap and the loan rate. The 
policy instrument also becomes more volatile. As a second result, we note that the 
difference between the worst-case equilibrium and the approximating equilibrium 
suggests that the central bank’s concern for misspecification and, therefore, the robust 
policy is oriented towards stabilising the inflation rate, although the central bank also 
cares about minimising the welfare costs of the imperfect interest rate pass-through. 















Inflation 22.8  ×  10
-7 25.5 × 10
-7 18.3 × 10
-7 2.7 × 10
-7 -4.5 × 10
-7
Output gap  4262.9 × 10
-7 7770.7 × 10
-7 4529.8 × 10
-7 3507.7 × 10
-7 266.9 × 10
-7
Loan rate  3990.8 × 10
-7 4413.8 × 10
-7 4258.1 × 10
-7 423.0 × 10
-7 267.3 × 10
-7
Policy rate  3033.6 × 10
-7 3223.7 × 10
-7 3276.2 × 10
-7 190.1 × 10
-7 242.6 × 10
-7
The second result hinges on the assumption that every equation of the model is 
prone to misspecification. In principle, this may not necessarily be the case if the 
policymaker is particularly concerned about a specific economic relation, while 
neglecting uncertainty in others. For instance, the policymaker might be uncertain in 
particular regarding the imperfect interest rate pass-through or might be particular 
concerned about price stickiness. Uncertainty surrounding only one equation allows us 
to reveal that the policymaker shifts its focus in stabilising the target variables. In the 
following, we therefore illustrate three special cases when uncertainty surrounds only 
one equation.
3.4  A specific concern: Uncertainty surrounding only one equation 
Now, the central bank and the private sector face uncertainty in only one of the three 
economic relations.
11 In other words, we allow no more than one of the three model 
equations to be misspecified.
12 To highlight in which way the central bank guards itself 
against misspecification, we report in Table 5 the percentage change in the variance of 
the approximating equilibrium relative to the RE equilibrium. If the central bank faces 
uncertainty only in the Phillips curve  (1), the changes in the variances coincide 
qualitatively with the benchmark model (misspecification in all equations). Volatility in 
                                                
11  In Appendix A3, Table A2 gives the changes of the policymaker’s optimal implicit instrument rules. 
Figures A4 to A6 display the corresponding impulse responses for each of the three shocks.  
12   Technically, we set the standard error of two of the three shocks to zero so that they practically 
disappear from the model. Note that the degree of misspecification in an equation depends positively 
on the variance of the shock associated with the equation, given the preference for robustness. To 
allow for a meaningful comparison, all models are calibrated again to a detection error probability of 
20 percent.
16inflation is dampened pre-emptively, whereas volatility increases for the other variables, 
including the policy instrument. If uncertainty is present only in the IS equation (2) or 
the loan rate equation (3), the robust policy shifts its concern for stabilisation. As a third 
notable result, we find that, in both cases, the central bank reduces the volatility in the 
output gap and the loan rate, but accepts higher volatility in inflation. The result hinges 
crucially on the assumption that the policymaker is not concerned about model 
uncertainty regarding the Phillips curve. With respect to the policy instrument, there is a 
marked difference. Uncertainty in the loan rate equation leads to a more volatile policy 
instrument, whereas uncertainty in the IS equation reduces volatility in the policy rate. 
The central bank responds more aggressively to a loan rate shock but less aggressively 
to a demand shock. 
Table 5: Percentage change in variances for approximating equilibrium 
Uncertainty surrounding…  Inflation  Output gap  Loan rate  Policy rate 
… all three equations  -19.80          6.26          6.70          8.00         
… only Phillips curve  -1.82          7.98          116.72          87.39         
… only IS equation  48.03          -2.15          -1.28          -1.08         
… only loan rate equation  52.69          -2.31          -1.37          1.17         
Note: Percentage change in variance of the approximating equilibrium relative to the RE equilibrium. All 
four models are calibrated to a detection error probability of 20 percent. 
4 Conclusions 
In general, the central bank acknowledges that every model is incomplete and, 
therefore, a misspecified description of reality. In order to prevent very bad outcomes, 
the central bank needs to design a policy that is robust against model misspecification. 
We incorporate model uncertainty by following the robust control approach along the 
lines of Hansen and Sargent (2008) and assume that the true model is not known but lies 
in the neighbourhood around a reference model.  
We employ as a reference model a version of the New Keynesian model that is 
able to replicate key stylised facts of the monetary transmission mechanism in the euro 
17area. The model incorporates financial intermediaries and features imperfect interest 
rate pass-through from the policy rate to the loan rate. The effects of the central bank’s 
concern for robustness can be summarised as follows. First, we observe that monetary 
policy responds either more cautiously or more aggressively, depending on the type of 
shock. The ambiguity stems from the fact that the central bank sets the interest rate such 
that the volatility of inflation is not increased by the policy response. In those cases 
where the response itself raises the volatility of inflation, the central bank responds 
more cautiously otherwise it responds more aggressively. Our result stands in contrast 
to the standard New Keynesian model, where a preference for robustness always makes 
the central bank respond more aggressively. 
Second, robustness comes at a cost: the central bank dampens volatility in the 
inflation rate pre-emptively, but simultaneously accepts higher volatility in the output 
gap and the loan rate. The difference between the worst-case equilibrium and the 
approximating equilibrium suggests that the central bank’s concern for misspecification 
and, therefore, the robust policy is oriented towards stabilising the inflation rate, 
although the central bank also cares about minimising the welfare costs of the imperfect 
interest rate pass-through. 
Third, if the central bank faces uncertainty only in the Phillips curve, the changes 
of the variances coincide qualitatively with the benchmark model (misspecification in 
all equations). If uncertainty is present only in the IS equation or the loan rate equation, 
however, the robust policy shifts its concern for stabilisation. We find that, in both 
cases, the central bank reduces the volatility in the output gap and the loan rate, but 
accepts higher volatility in inflation. The result hinges crucially on the assumption that 
the policymaker is not concerned about model uncertainty regarding the Phillips curve. 
18Appendix
A1  New Keynesian model with imperfect interest rate pass-through 
We describe the New Keynesian model following Kobayashi (2008). The economy 
consists of a representative household, intermediate goods firms, final goods firms, 
commercial banks, and a central bank. 
Households
The household obtains utility from a consumption bundle and disutility from supplying 




























¡° w ¡° ¢± ¨  and   and  	
 t Cj 	 
 t Li  indicate the consumption of 
differentiated final good   and hours worked at intermediate goods firm in region 
The parameter T  denotes the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and 
 denotes the elasticity of labour supply. Below, the index 
j . i
X 	 
 0,1 i  denotes a specific 
region as well as a variety of intermediate goods. By assumption, there is only one 
intermediate goods firm in each region. The parameter   symbolises the elasticity 
of substitution between the varieties of consumption (ie final) goods. The aggregate 
price index can be obtained from the optimal allocation of consumption goods and is 
defined as 
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The household needs cash in order to purchase consumption goods. At the 
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tt WiLid i ¨  denotes total wage income 
paid in advance by intermediate goods firms. The household has the possibility of 
19making a one-period deposit  	 




 tt R Di at the end of the period. The household holds deposits at all of the 
commercial banks. At the beginning of period   the following cash-in-advance 
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where  denotes the sum of profits transferred from firms and commercial banks, and 
 denotes a lump-sum tax. 
t 1
t T
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t  (A4) 
Intermediate goods firm 
Each intermediate goods firm   produces a differentiated intermediate good  i 	 
 t Z i  by 
using labour of type i as the only input factor. The production function is simply given 
by the following linear technology  	 
 	 
. tt Z iL i   Each intermediate goods firm must 
pay the wage bill before the goods markets open. Specifically, at the beginning of 
period  firm i borrows funds  t 	 
 	 
 tt WiLi from commercial bank i at the gross nominal 
rate  .
i




tt t R WiLi




tt t MCi R Wi   By 
assumption, firm i borrows funds only from the regional bank   since the loan markets 
are geographically segmented. This assumption rules out arbitrage and implies that 
lending rates may differ across banks. For simplicity, it is assumed that intermediate 
i
20goods firms are able to set their prices fully flexibly. As the intermediate goods firm 
needs to borrow funds, the lending rate is an additional production cost. A rise in the 
lending rate raises marginal cost and, thus, the intermediate goods price.
13
Final goods firms 
Each final goods firm uses a composite of intermediate goods as the only input for 





















with   denoting the elasticity of substitution between the varieties of intermediate 
goods and 
1 z R 
	 
 t Yj  and  	 

j
t Z i  denoting a differentiated consumption good and the firm 
’s demand for individual intermediate good   respectively. Choosing the optimal 
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 Consequently, the firm  ’s demand for the individual 
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Final goods firms are not able to adjust prices flexibly. Following Calvo (1983), a 
fraction 1  of firms can change their prices, while the remaining fraction G  cannot. 
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 (A7) 
                                                
13  Note, since lending rates can differ across firms, they are a potential source of price dispersion. 
21where  is the price of final goods set by firms that can adjust prices in period t and 
 represents the stochastic discount factor up to period   The parameter 
t P 
, tt s  ( . ts 
f U
denotes a subsidy rate given by  	
 1
f
f UR  1  to remove the distortions due to 
monopolistic competition in the final goods sector. 
Commercial bank 
At the start of every period, each intermediate goods firm   is required to borrow funds 
from commercial bank   of the same region in order to pay the wage bill in advance. 





 tt WiLi to intermediate goods firm   Also at the 
beginning of period t, commercial bank   receives deposit 
. i
i 	 
 t Di from the household 
and money injection  1 tt t MM  w % M
,1 .
 from the central bank.
14 In equilibrium, the 





 ,0 tt t t WiLi Di M i  %  (A8) 
The left-hand side can be understood as representing the demand for funds, whereas the 
right-hand side represents the supply of funds. At the end of period t commercial bank 
 repays its principle plus interest  i 	 
 tt R Di to the household. The household receives 
the money injection indirectly from the central bank through the profit transfer from 
commercial banks. 












where  is a function of aggregate variables that individual firms and commercial 






t R  as an increase in 
i
t R  raises the marginal cost, thereby decreasing production.
                                                
14  The former is a liability of the commercial bank, the latter is net worth. 
22By assumption, a commercial bank can adjust its loan rate only with probability 
 This probability of adjustment is independent of the time between adjustments. 
The problem of the commercial bank i can then be stated as 
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where  denotes a subsidy rate. The commercial bank in region   takes as given 
    
b U i , t P
,
z
t P  , t Y , t C , t M %  and  t R  while taking into account the effect of a change in 
i
t R  on 
	 
 	 
. tt WiLi Kobayashi (2008) shows that the optimality condition implies that all 
commercial banks which adjust in the same period set an identical loan rate  . t R   Newly 
adjusted loan rates depend largely on the expectations of future policy rates as well as 
the current policy rate. This stems essentially from the forward-looking staggered loan 
rate setting of commercial banks.  
23A2  Robust monetary policy under discretion 
Table A1: Parameters of optimal implicit instrument rule under discretion 
t e t u t l 1 t rl 
RE rule  0.61         1.54         0.03         0.10        
Robust rule  0.50         1.50         0.00         0.10        
Change in percent  -18.02         -2.46         -89.50         -0.37        
Note: The model is calibrated to a detection error probability of 30 percent by setting T = 0.0216. 
Differences due to rounding errors. 
Figure A1: Impulse responses to cost-push shock under discretion 






































24Figure A2: Impulse responses to demand shock under discretion 













































25Figure A3: Impulse responses to loan rate shock under discretion 




































26A3  Uncertainty surrounding only one equation 
Table A2: Percentage change in parameters of optimal implicit instrument 
rules
Uncertainty surrounding… 






… all three equations  7.153    -1.737    4.211    -0.273    -0.061    -0.002    -0.170   
… only Phillips curve  7.926    -1.922    4.658    -0.330    -0.036    -0.009    -0.207   
… only IS equation  4.546    -1.124    2.725    -0.007    -0.199    0.036    0.002   
… only loan rate equation  4.900    -1.212    2.937    -0.008    -0.211    0.038    0.002   
Note: Percentage change in coefficient of the robust rule relative to the RE rule in percent. All four 
models are calibrated to a detection error probability of 20 percent. 
Figure A4: Impulse responses if uncertainty only in the Phillips curve 






































Note: Impulse responses to a cost-push shock. The model is calibrated to a detection error probability of 
20 percent by setting T = 0.009336. 
27Figure A5: Impulse responses if uncertainty only in the IS equation 








































Note: Impulse responses to a demand shock. The model is calibrated to a detection error probability of 
20 percent by setting T = 0.001172. 
28Figure A6: Impulse responses if uncertainty only in the loan rate equation 
































Note: Impulse responses to a loan rate shock. The model is calibrated to a detection error probability of 
20 percent by setting T = 0.000495. 
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